

Consumer Theory

Assumption 1.1: *We will always assume that X is a closed and convex set*

$x \succsim y$: bundle x is at least as good as the bundle y

Axiom 1.1: Completeness: $\forall x, y \in X \Rightarrow x \succsim y$ or $y \succsim x$

Axiom 1.2: Transitivity: $\forall x, y, z \in X$, if $x \succsim y$ and $y \succsim z \Rightarrow x \succsim z$

Definition 1.1: *The relation \succsim on the consumption set X is called a **preference relation** if it satisfies Axioms 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.*

DEFINITION 1.2 **Strict Preference Relation**

The binary relation \succ on the consumption set X is defined as follows:

$$\mathbf{x}^1 \succ \mathbf{x}^2 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \mathbf{x}^1 \succsim \mathbf{x}^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{x}^2 \not\succeq \mathbf{x}^1.$$

The relation \succ is called the strict preference relation induced by \succsim , or simply the strict preference relation when \succsim is clear. The phrase $\mathbf{x}^1 \succ \mathbf{x}^2$ is read, ' \mathbf{x}^1 is strictly preferred to \mathbf{x}^2 '.

DEFINITION 1.3 **Indifference Relation**

The binary relation \sim on the consumption set X is defined as follows:


$$\mathbf{x}^1 \sim \mathbf{x}^2 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \mathbf{x}^1 \succsim \mathbf{x}^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{x}^2 \succsim \mathbf{x}^1.$$

The relation \sim is called the indifference relation induced by \succsim , or simply the indifference relation when \succsim is clear. The phrase $\mathbf{x}^1 \sim \mathbf{x}^2$ is read, ' \mathbf{x}^1 is indifferent to \mathbf{x}^2 '.


DEFINITION 1.4 Sets in X Derived from the Preference Relation

Let \mathbf{x}^0 be any point in the consumption set, X . Relative to any such point, we can define the following subsets of X :


1. $\succeq(\mathbf{x}^0) \equiv \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in X, \mathbf{x} \succeq \mathbf{x}^0\}$, called the 'at least as good as' set.
2. $\preceq(\mathbf{x}^0) \equiv \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in X, \mathbf{x}^0 \succeq \mathbf{x}\}$, called the 'no better than' set.
3. $\prec(\mathbf{x}^0) \equiv \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in X, \mathbf{x}^0 \succ \mathbf{x}\}$, called the 'worse than' set.
4. $\succ(\mathbf{x}^0) \equiv \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in X, \mathbf{x} \succ \mathbf{x}^0\}$, called the 'preferred to' set.
5. $\sim(\mathbf{x}^0) \equiv \{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in X, \mathbf{x} \sim \mathbf{x}^0\}$, called the 'indifference' set.




Axiom 1.3 Continuity: $\forall y_0 \in X$, the sets $\{x : x \succeq y_0\}$ and $\{x : y_0 \succeq x\}$ are closed sets. It follows that $\{x : x \succ y_0\}$ and $\{x : y_0 \succ x\}$ are open sets.



AXIOM 4': Local Non-satiation. For all $\mathbf{x}^0 \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, and for all $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists some $\mathbf{x} \in B_\varepsilon(\mathbf{x}^0) \cap \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $\mathbf{x} \succ \mathbf{x}^0$.




AXIOM 4: Strict Monotonicity. For all $\mathbf{x}^0, \mathbf{x}^1 \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, if $\mathbf{x}^0 \geq \mathbf{x}^1$ then $\mathbf{x}^0 \succsim \mathbf{x}^1$, while if $\mathbf{x}^0 \gg \mathbf{x}^1$, then $\mathbf{x}^0 \succ \mathbf{x}^1$.



AXIOM 5': Convexity. If $\mathbf{x}^1 \succsim \mathbf{x}^0$, then $t\mathbf{x}^1 + (1 - t)\mathbf{x}^0 \succsim \mathbf{x}^0$ for all $t \in [0, 1]$.

A slightly stronger version of this is the following:

AXIOM 5: Strict Convexity. If $\mathbf{x}^1 \neq \mathbf{x}^0$ and $\mathbf{x}^1 \succsim \mathbf{x}^0$, then $t\mathbf{x}^1 + (1 - t)\mathbf{x}^0 \succ \mathbf{x}^0$ for all $t \in (0, 1)$.



Συνάρτηση Χρησιμότητας (Utility function)

DEFINITION 1.5 ***A Utility Function Representing the Preference Relation \succsim***

A real-valued function $u: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is called a utility function representing the preference relation \succsim , if for all $\mathbf{x}^0, \mathbf{x}^1 \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $u(\mathbf{x}^0) \geq u(\mathbf{x}^1) \iff \mathbf{x}^0 \succsim \mathbf{x}^1$.

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THEOREM 1.1 ***Existence of a Real-Valued Function Representing the Preference Relation \succsim***

If the binary relation \succsim is complete, transitive, continuous, and strictly monotonic, there exists a continuous real-valued function, $u: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, which represents \succsim .

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THEOREM 1.2 ***Invariance of the Utility Function to Positive Monotonic Transforms***

Let \succsim be a preference relation on \mathbb{R}_+^n and suppose $u(\mathbf{x})$ is a utility function that represents it. Then $v(\mathbf{x})$ also represents \succsim if and only if $v(\mathbf{x}) = f(u(\mathbf{x}))$ for every \mathbf{x} , where $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing on the set of values taken on by u .

THEOREM 1.3 ***Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions***

Let \succsim be represented by $u: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Then:

- 1. $u(\mathbf{x})$ is strictly increasing if and only if \succsim is strictly monotonic.*
- 2. $u(\mathbf{x})$ is quasiconcave if and only if \succsim is convex.*
- 3. $u(\mathbf{x})$ is strictly quasiconcave if and only if \succsim is strictly convex.*

$$u(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{1/4} x_2^{1/4}$$




Figure 3.4: Function $u(x)$




Figure 3.5: Level sets of $u(x)$

$$v(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{3/2} x_2^{3/2}$$




Figure 3.6: Function $v(x)$




Figure 3.7: Level sets of $v(x)$.

Marginal Rate of Substitution

$$MRS_{ij}(x) = \frac{dx_j}{dx_i} = -\frac{\partial u(x) / \partial x_i}{\partial u(x) / \partial x_j} = -\frac{\text{marginal utility of good i}}{\text{marginal utility of good j}}$$

Utility Maximization Problem

$$B = \{x \mid x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n : px \leq w\} \quad \text{Budget Set}$$

Utility Maximization Problem

Utility Maximization Problem

ASSUMPTION 1.2 Consumer Preferences

The consumer's preference relation \succsim is complete, transitive, continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex on \mathbb{R}_+^n . Therefore, by Theorems 1.1 and 1.3 it can be represented by a real-valued utility function, u , that is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave on \mathbb{R}_+^n .

Utility Maximization Problem

THEOREM 1.5 *Differentiable Demand*

Let $\mathbf{x}^* \gg \mathbf{0}$ solve the consumer's maximisation problem at prices $\mathbf{p}^0 \gg \mathbf{0}$ and income $y^0 > 0$. If

- u is twice continuously differentiable on \mathbb{R}_{++}^n ,
- $\partial u(\mathbf{x}^*)/\partial x_i > 0$ for some $i = 1, \dots, n$, and
- the bordered Hessian of u has a non-zero determinant at \mathbf{x}^* ,

then $\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{p}, y)$ is differentiable at (\mathbf{p}^0, y^0) .

THEOREM 1.6 **Properties of the Indirect Utility Function**

If $u(\mathbf{x})$ is continuous and strictly increasing on \mathbb{R}_+^n , then $v(\mathbf{p}, y)$ defined in (1.12) is


1. Continuous on $\mathbb{R}_{++}^n \times \mathbb{R}_+$,
2. Homogeneous of degree zero in (\mathbf{p}, y) ,
3. Strictly increasing in y ,
4. Decreasing in \mathbf{p} ,
5. Quasiconvex in (\mathbf{p}, y) .



Moreover, it satisfies

6. Roy's identity: If $v(\mathbf{p}, y)$ is differentiable at (\mathbf{p}^0, y^0) and $\partial v(\mathbf{p}^0, y^0)/\partial y \neq 0$, then

$$x_i(\mathbf{p}^0, y^0) = -\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}^0, y^0)/\partial p_i}{\partial v(\mathbf{p}^0, y^0)/\partial y}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Expenditure function





THEOREM 1.7 Properties of the Expenditure Function

If $u(\cdot)$ is continuous and strictly increasing, then $e(p, u)$ is:

- 1. continuous in p and u*
- 2. strictly increasing in u*
- 3. increasing in p*
- 4. homogeneous of degree one in p*
- 5. concave in p*

If in addition, $u(\cdot)$ is strictly quasiconcave (unique solution) we have:

- 6. Shephard's lemma: $e(p, u)$ is differentiable in p at (p^0, u^0) with $p^0 \gg 0$ and*

$$\frac{\partial e(p^0, u^0)}{\partial p_i} = x_i^h(p^0, u^0)$$

THEOREM 1.8 Relation between UMP and EMP

Suppose that $u(\cdot)$ is a continuous, strictly increasing utility function and that the price vector is $p \gg 0$. We have:

- (i) If x^* is optimal in the UMP when income is $w > 0$ then x^* is optimal in the EMP when the required utility level is $u(x^*) = v(p, w)$. Moreover, the minimized expenditure level in this EMP is exactly w*
- (ii) If x^* is optimal in the EMP when utility level is $u > u(0)$ then x^* is optimal in the UMP when $w = e(p, u) = px^*$. Moreover, the maximized utility level in this UMP is exactly u .*

THEOREM 1.8 Some important identities

Let $v(p, w)$ and $e(p, u)$ be the indirect utility function and expenditure function for some consumer whose utility function is continuous and strictly increasing. Then for all $p \gg 0$

1. $e(p, v(p, w)) = w$


2. $v(p, e(p, u)) = u$

If in addition the utility function is strictly quasi-concave


3. $h_i(p, v(p, w)) = x_i(p, w)$

4. $x_i(p, e(p, u)) = h_i(p, u)$

INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS



INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS



THEOREM 1.9 The Slutsky Equation

Let $x(p, w)$ be the consumer's Marshallian demand system. Let u^* be the level of utility the consumer achieves at prices P and income W . Then

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial x_i(p, w)}{\partial p_j}}_{TE} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial h_i(p, u^*)}{\partial p_j}}_{SE} - \underbrace{x_j(p, w) \frac{\partial x_i(p, w)}{\partial w}}_{IE} \quad i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

THEOREM 1.10 Negative Own-Substitution Terms

Let $h(p, u)$ be the Hicksian demand for good i . Then

$$\frac{\partial h_i(p, u)}{\partial p_i} \leq 0 \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

THEOREM 1.11 Properties of the Hicksian demand price derivatives

Let $x^h(p,u)$ be the consumer's system of Hicksian demands and suppose that the expenditure function $e(\cdot)$ is twice continuously differentiable.

Denote

$$D_p(h(p,u)) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial h_1(p,u)}{\partial p_1} & \frac{\partial h_1(p,u)}{\partial p_2} & \dots & \frac{\partial h_1(p,u)}{\partial p_n} \\ \frac{\partial h_2(p,u)}{\partial p_1} & \frac{\partial h_2(p,u)}{\partial p_2} & \dots & \frac{\partial h_2(p,u)}{\partial p_n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \frac{\partial h_n(p,u)}{\partial p_1} & \frac{\partial h_n(p,u)}{\partial p_2} & \dots & \frac{\partial h_n(p,u)}{\partial p_n} \end{bmatrix}$$

Then

1.

$$D_p(h(p,u)) = D_p^2(e(p,u)) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_1^2} & \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_2 \partial p_1} & \cdots & \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_n \partial p_1} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_1 \partial p_n} & \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_2 \partial p_n} & \cdots & \frac{\partial^2 e(p,u)}{\partial p_n^2} \end{bmatrix}$$

2. $D_p(h(p,u))$ is symmetric $\Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial h_i(p,u)}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial h_j(p,u)}{\partial p_i}$

3. $D_p(h(p,u))$ is negative semi-definite

THEOREM 1.12 Symmetric and Negative Semi-definite Slutsky Matrix

Let $x(p, w)$ be the consumer's Marshallian demand system. Define the ij th Slutsky term as

$$\frac{\partial x_i(p, w)}{\partial p_j} + \frac{\partial x_i(p, w)}{\partial w} x_j(p, w)$$

and form the entire $n \times n$ Slutsky matrix as follows

$$S(p, w) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial x_1(p, w)}{\partial p_1} + x_1(p, w) \frac{\partial x_1(p, w)}{\partial w} & \dots & \frac{\partial x_1(p, w)}{\partial p_n} + x_n(p, w) \frac{\partial x_1(p, w)}{\partial w} \\ & \dots & \\ & \dots & \\ \frac{\partial x_n(p, w)}{\partial p_1} + x_1(p, w) \frac{\partial x_n(p, w)}{\partial w} & \dots & \frac{\partial x_n(p, w)}{\partial p_n} + x_n(p, w) \frac{\partial x_n(p, w)}{\partial w} \end{bmatrix}$$

Then $S(p, w)$ is symmetric and negative semi-definite.